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The Sabra and Shatila massacre was the killing of between 762 and 3,500 civilians, mostly Palestinians and Lebanese Shiites, by a militia close to the Kataeb Party, also called Phalange, a predominantly Christian Lebanese right-wing party in the Sabra neighborhood and the adjacent Shatila refugee camp in Beirut, Lebanon. From approximately 6:00 pm 16 September to 8:00 am 18 September 1982, a widespread massacre was carried out by the militia virtually under the eyes of their Israeli allies.〔Robert Fisk, (''Pity the Nation:Lebanon at War,'' ) Oxford University Press 2001 pp.382-3.〕〔William B. Quandt, (''Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967,'' ) University of California Press p.266〕〔Yossi Alpher, (''Periphery: Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies,'' ) Rowman & Littlefield, 2015 p.48〕〔Nathan Gonzalez, ( ''The Sunni-Shia Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East,'' ) Nortia Media Ltd, 2013 p.113.〕 The Phalanges, allies to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), were ordered by the IDF to clear out Sabra and Shatila from PLO fighters, as part of the IDF maneuvering into West Beirut. The IDF received reports of some of the Phalanges atrocities in Sabra and Shatila but failed to stop them. The massacre was presented as retaliation for the assassination of newly elected Lebanese president Bachir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Kataeb Party. It was wrongly assumed that Palestinian militants had carried out the assassination. In June 1982, the Israel Defense Forces had invaded Lebanon with the intention of rooting out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). By mid-1982, under the supervision of the Multinational Force, the PLO withdrew from Lebanon following weeks of battles in West Beirut and shortly before the massacre took place. Various forces — Israeli, Phalangists and possibly also the South Lebanon Army (SLA) — were in the vicinity of Sabra and Shatila at the time of the slaughter, taking advantage of the fact that the Multinational Force had removed barracks and mines that had encircled Beirut's predominantly Muslim neighborhoods and kept the Israelis at bay during the Beirut siege. The Israeli advance over West Beirut in the wake of the PLO withdrawal, which enabled the Phalangist raid, was considered a violation of the ceasefire agreement between the various forces.〔 The Israeli Army surrounded Sabra and Shatila and stationed troops at the exits of the area to prevent camp residents from leaving and, at the Phalangists' request, fired illuminating flares at night. According to Alain Menargues, the direct perpetrators of the killings were the "Young Men", a gang recruited by Elie Hobeika, a prominent figure in the Phalanges, the Lebanese Forces intelligence chief and liaison officer with Mossad, from men who had been expelled from the Lebanese Forces for insubordination or criminal activities. The killings are widely believed to have taken place under Hobeika's direct orders. Hobeika's family and fiancée had been murdered by Palestinian militiamen, and their Lebanese allies, at the Damour massacre of 1976,〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Obituary: Elie Hobeika | World news | The Guardian | Mostyn, Trevor, Friday 25 January 2002 )〕〔Friedman, ''New York Times'', 20, 21, 26, 27 September 1982.〕 itself a response to the 1976 Karantina massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims at the hands of Christian militants. Hobeika later became a long-serving Member of the Parliament of Lebanon and served in several ministerial roles. Other Phalangist commanders involved were Joseph Edde from South Lebanon, Dib Anasta, head of the Phalangist Military Police, Michael Zouein, and Maroun Mischalani from East Beirut. In all 300-400 militiamen were involved, including some from Sa'ad Haddad's South Lebanon Army.〔Bulloch, John (1983) ''Final Conflict. The War in Lebanon.'' Century London. ISBN 0-7126-0171-6. p.231〕 In 1983, a commission chaired by Seán MacBride, the assistant to the UN Secretary General and President of United Nations General Assembly at the time, concluded that Israel, as the camp's occupying power, bore responsibility for the violence. The commission also concluded that the massacre was a form of genocide. In 1983, the Israeli Kahan Commission, appointed to investigate the incident, found that Israeli military personnel, aware that a massacre was in progress, had failed to take serious steps to stop it. The commission deemed Israel indirectly responsible, and Ariel Sharon, then Defense Minister, bore personal responsibility "for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge", forcing him to resign.〔 ==Background== From 1975 to 1990, groups in competing alliances with neighboring countries fought against each other in the Lebanese Civil War. Infighting and massacres between these groups claimed several thousand victims. Examples: the Syrian-backed Karantina massacre (January 1976) by the Kataeb and its allies against Kurds, Syrians and Palestinians in this predominantly Muslim slum district of Beirut, Damour (January 1976) by the PLO against Christian Maronites, including the family and fiancée of the Lebanese Forces intelligence chief Elie Hobeika; and Tel al-Zaatar (August 1976) by Phalangists and their allies against Palestinian refugees living in a camp administered by UNRWA. The total death toll in Lebanon for the whole civil war period was around 150,000 victims.〔''The New York Times'' (2012). ("After 2 Decades, Scars of Lebanon's Civil War Block Path to Dialogue" ).〕 The PLO had been attacking Israel from southern Lebanon and Israel had been bombing PLO positions in southern Lebanon since the early 1970s till early 1980s.〔"Israel: A Country Study", Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988 ((online copy ))〕〔 "In July 1981 Israel responded to PLO rocket attacks on northern Israeli settlements by bombing PLO encampments in southern Lebanon. United States envoy Philip Habib eventually negotiated a shaky cease-fire that was monitored by UNIFIL."〕 The casus belli cited by the Israeli side to declare war, however, was an assassination attempt, on 3 June 1982, made upon Israeli Ambassador to Britain Shlomo Argov. The attempt was the work of the Iraq-based Abu Nidal, possibly with Syrian or Iraqi involvement.〔 Historians and observers such as David Hirst and Benny Morris have commented that the PLO could not be have been involved in the assault, or even approved of it: Abu Nidal's group was, after all, a bitter rival to Arafat's PLO and even murdered some of its members. The PLO also issued a condemnation of the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador.〔 Nonetheless Israel used the event as a justification to break the ceasefire with the PLO, and as a casus belli for a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. After the war, Israel presented its actions as a response to the "terrorism" being carried out by the PLO from several fronts, including from the border with Lebanon. However, the aforementioned historians have argued that the PLO was respecting the ceasefire agreement then in force with Israel and keeping the border between the Jewish state and Lebanon more stable than it had been for a period of over a decade. During that ceasefire, which lasted 8 months, UNIFIL — the UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon — reported that not a single act of provocation against Israel had been launched by the PLO. The Israeli government tried out several justifications to ditch the ceasefire and attack the PLO, at some point even eliciting accusations from the Israeli opposition that "demagogy" from the government threatened to pull Israel into war.〔 All such justifications, before the attempted assassination of the ambassador, had been shot down by its ally, the United States, as insufficient reason to launch a war against the PLO.〔 On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon moving northwards to surround the capital, Beirut. Following an extended siege of the city, the fighting was brought to an end with a U.S.-brokered agreement between the parties on 21 August 1982, which allowed for safe evacuation of the Palestinian fighters from the city under the supervision of Western nations and guaranteed the protection of refugees and the civilian residents of the refugee camps.〔 On 15 June 1982, 10 days after the start of the invasion, the Israeli Cabinet passed a proposal put forward by the Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, that the IDF should not enter West Beirut but this should be done by Lebanese Forces. Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, had already issued orders that the Lebanese predominantly Christian, right-wing militias should not take part in the fighting and the proposal was to counter public complaints that the IDF were suffering casualties whilst their allies were standing by.〔Kahan, Yitzhak, Barak, Aharon, Efrat, Yona (1983) ''The Commission of Inquiry into events at the refugee camps in Beirut 1983 FINAL REPORT (Authorized translation)'' p.108 has "This report was signed on 7 February 1982." p.11〕 The subsequent Israeli inquiry estimated the strength of militias in West Beirut, excluding Palestinians, to be around 7,000. They estimated the Phalange to be 5,000 when fully mobilized of whom 2,000 were full-time.〔Kahan. pp.13,7〕 On 23 August 1982, Bachir Gemayel, leader of the right-wing Lebanese Forces, was elected President of Lebanon by the National Assembly. Israel had relied on Gemayel and his forces as a counterbalance to the PLO, and as a result, ties between Israel and Maronite groups, from which hailed many of the supporters of the Lebanese Forces, had grown stronger.〔"By 1982, the Israeli-Maronite relationship was quite the open secret, with Maronite militiamen training in Israel and high-level Maronite and Israeli leaders making regular reciprocal visits to one another's homes and headquarters" (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, p. 45).〕〔(Sabra and Shatilla ), Jewish Voice for Peace. Accessed 17 July 2006.〕〔(Sabra and Shatila 20 years on ). BBC, 14 September 2002. Accessed 17 July 2006.〕 By 1 September, the PLO fighters had been evacuated from Beirut under the supervision of Multinational Force.〔 The evacuation was conditional on the continuation of the presence of the MNF to provide security for the community of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Two days later the Israeli Premier Menachem Begin met Gemayel in Nahariya and strongly urged him to sign a peace treaty with Israel. According to some sources,〔Jean Shaoul, (Sharon's war crimes in Lebanon: the record (part three) ), 25 February 2002 on the World Socialist Web Site (published by the ICFI). Accessed 3 February 2006.〕 Begin also wanted the continuing presence of the SLA in southern Lebanon (Haddad supported peaceful relations with Israel) in order to control attacks and violence, and action from Gemayel to move on the PLO fighters which Israel believed remained a hidden threat in Lebanon. However, the Phalangists, who were previously united as reliable Israeli allies, were now split because of developing alliances with Syria, which remained militarily hostile to Israel. As such, Gemayel rejected signing a peace treaty with Israel and did not authorize operations to root out the remaining PLO militants.〔Ahron Bregman and Jihan Al-Tahri. ''The Fifty Years War. Israel and the Arabs'', p. 172-174, London: BBC Books 1998, ISBN 0-14-026827-8〕 On 11 September 1982, the international forces that were guaranteeing the safety of Palestinian refugees left Beirut. Then on 14 September, Gemayel was assassinated in a massive explosion which demolished his headquarters. Eventually, the culprit, Habib Tanious Shartouni, a Lebanese Christian, confessed to the crime. He turned out to be a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and an agent of Syrian intelligence. Palestinian and Lebanese Muslim leaders denied any connection to him.〔Walid Harb, (Snake Eat Snake ) ''The Nation'', posted 1 July 1999 (19 July 1999 issue). Accessed 9 February 2006.〕 On the evening of 14 September, following the news that Bashir Gemayel had been assassinated, Prime Minister Begin, Minister for Defence Sharon and Chief of Staff Eitan agreed that the Israeli army should invade West Beirut. The public reason given was to be that they were there to prevent chaos. In a separate conversation, at 8.30 pm that evening, Sharon and Eitan agreed that the IDF should not enter the Palestinian refugee camps but that the Phalange should be used.〔Kahan. pp.13,14〕 The only other member of the cabinet who was consulted was Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir.〔Shahid, Leila. ''The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports''. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 36–58.〕 Shortly after 6.00 am 15 September, the Israeli army entered West Beirut,〔Kahan. p.15〕 This Israeli action breached its agreement with the United States not to occupy West Beirut〔Panorama: "The Accused", broadcast by the BBC, 17 June 2001; (transcript ) accessed 9 February 2006.〕 and was in violation of the ceasefire.〔Mark Ensalaco, (''Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11,'' ) University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012 p.137.〕 Fawwaz Traboulsi writes that while the massacre was presented as a reaction to the assassination of Bachir, it represented the posthumous achievement of his "radical solution" to Palestinians in Lebanon, who he thought of as "people too many" in the region. Later, the Israeli army’s monthly journal ''Skira Hodechith'' wrote that the Lebanese Forces hoped to provoke "the general exodus of the Palestinian population" and aimed to create a new demographic balance in Lebanon favouring the Christians. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Sabra and Shatila massacre」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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